Software Protection Research

ISSISP 2017 — Program Analysis

Christian Collberg

Department of Computer Science University of Arizona

http://collberg.cs.arizona.edu collberg@gmail.com

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What is Program Analysis? Control Flow Analysis

Discussion

What is Program Analysis?

Program Analysis

```
int foo() {
  int x;
  int* y;
  printf(x+*y);
}
```



- ◆Who calls foo?
- ♦Who does foo call?
- ◆Is x ever initialized?
- ◆Can y ever be null?
- ◆What will foo print?

• Defenders: need to analyze their program to protect it!

- ♦ Who calls foo?
- ♦ Who does foo call?
- ◆ Is x ever initialized?
- ◆Can y ever be null?
- What will foo print?


```
Tigress
```



Obfuscate

```
int foo'() {
```






• Attackers: need to analyze our program to modify it!

- ♦ Who calls foo?
- ♦ Who does foo call?
- ◆ Is x ever initialized?
- ◆Can y ever be null?
- What will foo print?

```
int foo'() {
              De-obfuscate
```

- ◆ Extract Code!
- ◆ Discover Algorithms!
- ◆ Find Design!
- ◆ Find Keys!
- ◆ Modify Code!



Two kinds of analyses:

- •static analysis: collect information about a program by studying its code;
- •dynamic analysis: collect information from *executing* the program.

• static analysis: collect information about a program by studying its code


```
int foo() {
    ... ... ...
}
```

Static Analysis

I.e. we analyze the source or binary code of the program itself.

- ♦ Who calls foo?
- ♦ Who does foo call?
- ◆ Is x ever initialized?
- ◆ Can y ever be null?
- ◆ What will foo print?

• dynamic analysis: collect information from executing the program.



Program inputs

Dynamic Analysis

I.e. we analyze a trace of the program as it is running on some particular input

- ♦ Who calls foo?
- ♦ Who does foo call?
- ◆ Is x ever initialized?
- ◆ Can y ever be null?
- ◆ What will foo print?

Static Analyses

- control-flow graphs: representation of (possible) control-flow in functions.
- call graphs: representation of (possible) function calls.
- disassembly: turn raw executables into assembly code.
- decompilation: turn raw assembly code into source code.

Dynamic Analyses


- debugging: what path does the program take?
- •tracing: which functions/system calls get executed?
- •profiling: what gets executed the most?

Control Flow Analysis


Control-Flow Graph (CFG)

- A way to represent the possible flow of control inside a function.
- Nodes: called basic blocks. Each block consists of straight-line code ending (possibly) in a branch.
- Edges: An edge A → B means that control could flow from A to B.
- There is one unique entry node and one unique exit node.


```
int foo() {
  printf("Boo!");
}
```




```
int foo() {
    x=1;
    y=2;
    printf(x+y);
}
```



```
int foo() {
    read(x);
    if (x>0)
        printf(x);
}
```



```
int foo() {
  read(x);
  if (x>0)
    printf(x);
  else
    printf(x+1);
}
```



```
int foo() {
                             B1:
                                   x=10;
                                   if (x \le 0) goto B3
  x=10;
 while (x>0){
    printf(x);
                          B2:
                               printf(x);
    x=x-1;
                               x=x-1;
                               goto B1;
                                  B3:
                                          EXIT
```

ENTRY

B0:

- 1.Mark every instruction which can start a basic block as a leader:
 - 1. the first instruction
 - 2. a target of a branch
 - 3. any instruction following a conditional branch
- 2.A basic block: the instructions from a leader up to, but not including, the next leader.
- 3.Add an edge A→B if A ends with a branch to B or can fall through to B.

Exercise!

```
X \leftarrow 20;
while (X<10) {
      X \leftarrow X - 1;
      A[X] \leftarrow 10;
      if (X=4)
            X \leftarrow X - 2;
};
Y \leftarrow X + 5;
```

```
1: X←20
2: if X>=10 goto (8)
3: X←X-1
4: A[X]←10
5: if X!=4 goto (7)
6: X←X-2
7: goto (2)
8: Y←X+5
```

Convert to CFG! First simplify!

Work with your friends!!!

Disassembly

• Attackers: prefer looking at assembly code than machine code

```
int foo() {
    ... ... ...
}

Compile

011010101010
010101011111
```

Disassemble

foo.exe

000011100101

add r1,r2,r3
ld r2,[r3]
call bar
cmp r1,r4
bgt L2




Static Disassembly

```
objdump -d i/bin/ls | less
```


Code Address Assembly 48 68 68 83 1. 0x2. 0xbp 3. 0x4. 0x5. 0x5d 68 6. 0x7. 0x38 8. 0x9. 0x,%rax 10. 0x%rsi 11. 0x12. 0xd 13. 38 00 1000045b0 0xd9a: e9 00 jmpq 0xd9f: 55 14. push %rbp

•Disassembly is hard! And sometimes disassemblers get it wrong!



•In general, this is always the case: program analysis is more or less precise.

- There are two general algorithm ideas for disassembly:
 - 1. Linear Sweep Traversal
 - 2. Recursive Traversal
- •At times, both with fail.
- We typically add heuristics to improve precision.



```
push
           %rbp
           %rsp,%rbp
   mov
   add
3.
           $0x68,%rdi
   add
           $0x68,%rsi
           %rbp
5.
   pop
           1000045b0
6.
   jmpq
           %rbp
   push
```

Linear sweep disassembly 55 48 89 e5 48 83 c7 68 48 83 c6 68 5d e9 26 38 00 00 55

0xd78 push %rbp 0xd79: %rsp,%rbp mov 3. 0xd7c: add \$0x68,%rdi \$0x68,%rsi 0xd80: add 5. 0xd84: %rbp pop jmpq 0x45b0 0xd85:

push

%rbp

0xd8a

Recursive traversal disassembly

 Stack

 0xd8a

 0x45760

Exercise!

```
    0xd78: push %rbp
    0xd79: mov %rsp,%rbp
    0xd7c: add $0x68,%rdi
    0xd80: add $0x68,%rsi
    0xd84: pop %rbp
    0xd85: jmpq 0x45b0
    0xd8a: .byte 0x55
    0xd8b: mov %rdi,%rbp
```

```
0x55 ≡ push %rbp!!!
```

 How would a linear sweep disassembly handle this code?

Exercise!

```
1. 0xd78: push %rbp
2. 0xd79: mov %rsp,%rbp
3. 0xd7c: add $0x68,%rdi
4. 0xd80: add $0x68,%rsi
5. 0xd84: pop %rbp
6. 0xd85: jmpr %rdi
7.0xd8b: mov %rdi,%rbp
```

Indirect jump!

 How would a recursive traversal disassembly handle this code?

